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ABSTRACT 
 
There is increasing scholarly attention to judicial enforcement 
of the right to health, but too often it extrapolates general lessons 
from one country or region.  The impacts of judicial enforcement 
depend largely on the reasons people turn to courts, the nature of 
judicial decisions, and the extent to which courts can open political 
opportunity structures for greater equity and transparency.  
Drawing on case studies from five countries in the region, the 
Article argues that the experience of constitutionalization and 
judicial enforcement of the right to health in Latin America shows 
a number of lessons and challenges.  Against backdrops of extreme 
social inequality, with poor responsiveness from the executive and 
legislative branches of government, as well as chronic regulatory 
failures within health systems, it is unsurprising that people take 
advantage of the favorable opportunity structures that exist in 
many courts.  Nevertheless, contrary to widespread thinking, easy 
access to justice, combined with individual decisions can promote 
queue jumping and potentially exacerbate inequities in health 
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systems.  The example of a mega-judgment in Colombia shows 
both that under certain circumstances apex courts can play 
important roles in catalyzing action by political branches but also 
suggests that there are significant limitations of transformative 
constitutionalism, at least in the health field. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The history of how health-related rights have evolved in Latin 
America is inextricably linked to contestation over boundaries 
between private morality and public policy, between individual 
and social responsibility for health, and between the role of the 
state and markets.  In a region of profound social inequalities1 that 
are deeply reflected in social determinants of health, as well as 
health outcomes, health systems have been sites of social 
contestation, from the incorporation of health and social 
protections for workers in the wake of enormous immigration to 
movements for social medicine to market-based liberalization and 
reforms.  Moreover, since colonial times, when health was largely 
conceived of as charity organized by religious institutions, there 
has remained a deeply embedded discourse of health conditions as 
divine punishment for “sin,”, which is most acutely evidenced in 
relation to sexual and reproductive health.2  Indeed, the right to 
health is perhaps the most radical of social rights because it 
challenges what is taken for granted as “natural.”3 
The contours of the right to health are also especially 
susceptible to the accelerating pace of pharmaceutical and 
technological innovation and the changing epidemiological profiles 
of populations.  Both trends not only drive demand in health care 
markets but also create ever more stress on financing those 
systems.  In the second half of the Twentieth Century, not only did 
much of the region—particularly urban populations—undergo a 
significant epidemiological transition from infectious diseases to 
chronic conditions, technological advancements also drove the 
organization of health systems to evolve significantly.  The 
archetypical physician with the little black bag was replaced by a 
                                                             
 1 Inter-American Development Bank, Gini Coefficient of Per Capita Household 
Income – Countries comparison, 
https://data.iadb.org/ViewIndicator/ViewIndicator?languageId=1&indicatorId=
1719&typeOfUrl=C [hereinafter IADB, GINI]. 
 2 Anne-Emmanuelle Birn & Laura Nervi, Political Roots of the Struggle for 
Health Justice in Latin America, 385 The Lancet 1174, 1174–1175 (2015) (discussing 
how social movements incorporated health care into struggles for better working 
and living conditions). 
 3 Alicia E. Yamin, Redefining Health: Challenging Power Relations, in POWER, 
SUFFERING, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DIGNITY: HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORKS FOR 
HEALTH AND WHY THEY MATTER 3, 73–98 (2015). 
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complex apparatus that depended upon specialized equipment 
and specialty practices, which in turn called for entirely different 
financing, as well as service delivery, arrangements.4 
In the late 1980’s and 1990’s, much of the region was facing the 
effects of structural adjustment policies, often adopted under 
undemocratic regimes, as well as new health reforms adding 
market-based regulation to fragmented regimes based largely on 
divisions between formal and informal employment sectors.  At 
the same time, in the wake of military dictatorships or particular 
political inflection points (e.g. Colombia), a wave of new 
constitutions and constitutional amendments came into being.  
These new constitutions enshrined principles of transformative 
constitutionalism that established social or welfare purposes as 
integral to the design of the state, sometimes included enumeration 
of specific social rights, and in many cases incorporated 
international human rights norms through “constitutional blocs” 
(“bloques de constitucionalidad”).  In conjunction with chronic 
democratic deficits and a lack of capacity on the part of many 
governments to either respond to public clamor for health 
demands or to effectively regulate health systems, easy individual 
access to courts through such protection writs has created an acute 
demand for medical treatments through judicial action.5 
One way of understanding judicialization of health rights in the 
region is precisely the gap between supply and demand, which 
was accentuated in many instances by health reforms that 
increased coverage of social insurance.6  However, in this Article I 
argue that this analysis understates a principal conceptual 
implication of construing health as a right, which is neither to deny 
the scarcity of resources nor the need for rationing.  It is rather to 
understand the health system as a core social institution, and the 
definition of the contours of an enforceable legal entitlement as 
requiring a legitimate democratic process just as much as a credible 
                                                             
 4 NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 161 
(Cambridge University Press ed., 2008). 
 5 Alicia E. Yamin, Power, Suffering and Courts: Reflections on Promoting Health 
Rights through Judicialization, in LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS: CAN COURTS BRING 
MORE JUSTICE TO HEALTH? 333–372 (2011) [hereinafter Yamin Reflections LHR]. 
 6 EVERALDO LAMPREA, DERECHOS EN LA PRÁCTICA. JUECES, LITIGANTES Y 
OPERADORES DE POLÍTICAS DE SALUD EN COLOMBIA (1991-2014) 31 (2015)  [hereinafter 
Lamprea, 2015]. 
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application of scientific-technical evidence.7  Understood in this 
light, health systems embed normative decisions, from macro-
levels in terms of solidarity of financing, including whether 
irregular migrants are included, to the most micro-levels regarding 
information provided by providers to patients.8  Further, in this 
view, courts have a role to play in ensuring that the decisions taken 
in health systems are justified and in keeping with fundamental 
constitutional commitments, ranging from safeguarding the 
dignity of women who seek abortions after sexual assault to the 
extent of governmental obligations to provide health entitlements 
that reflect equal concern and respect for all members of society.9 
Yet all too often in the region, judicial remedies have been 
appended onto broken systems and, while empirical evidence 
regarding the equity effects of the flood of legal enforcement of 
individual entitlements remains ambiguous, there are well-
founded concerns regarding the potential for judicialization to 
skew attention to curative care from public health promotion 
measures and to reduce aspirations for health justice to a feeble 
“sufficientarianism.”10  In Part II of this Article, I outline the 
constitutional provisions in relation to health rights11 in five 
countries in the region—Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
and Mexico—pointing to some shared contextual factors and 
concepts, as well as distinctive aspects that have shaped judicial 
interpretation.  In Part III, I then turn to experiences with 
judicialization of health rights in the region.  After briefly setting 
out some context for the wholesale exploitation of individual 
judicial actions, I explore the potential opportunities and 
                                                             
 7 Alicia E. Yamin, Taking the Right to Health Seriously: Implications for Courts 
and Health Systems’ 39(2) HUM. RTS. Q.  (2017) [hereinafter Yamin HRQ]. 
 8 Alicia E. Yamin & Ole F. Norheim, Taking Equality Seriously: Applying 
Human Rights Frameworks to Priority Setting in Health, 36 HUM. RTS. Q. 296, 296–324 
(2014) [hereinafter Yamin and Norheim HRQ]. 
 9 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación de Argentina [CSJN] [National 
Supreme Court of Justice], 13/5/2012, “F. A. L. s/medida autosatisfactiva, Fallos 
(259. XLVI) (Arg.); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 31, 
2008, Sentencia T-760/08 (Colom.) [hereafter Colombia T-760/08]. 
 10 Lukas Meyer, Sufficientarianism: Both International and Intergenerational? in 
ABSOLUTE POVERTY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE: EMPIRICAL DATA, MORAL THEORIES, 
INITIATIVES, 133–141 (Elke Mack et al. eds., 2009). 
 11 This phrase is used rather than the “right to health” because in the case of 
Costa Rica, the Court has derived the right to health from two constitutional 
rights: the protection of human life and the right to social security protection. 
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challenges of dialogical remedies as a response to massive 
judicialization.  This is based upon a case study of the most 
sweeping structural decision to date in this area, T 760/08, in 
which the Colombian Constitutional Court called for reform of the 
health system based upon the right to health.12  I conclude that 
while dialogical remedies can potentially foster dialogue with the 
executive as well as shifts in public discourse regarding health as a 
right, there are significant limitations to the extent to which 
judiciaries can destabilize the steep asymmetries of information 
and power within health sectors, and catalyze greater democratic 
participation in constructing the limits of health rights. 
2.  CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:  CONCEPTS AND CONTENT 
Although the actual constitutional provisions, as well as the 
nature of the health system, differ substantially across countries in 
the region, health rights are defined in terms of more than medical 
care and are connected to larger economic and social issues and 
policies in most of the constitutions of the region.  This is critical, as 
much greater percentages of population health and morbidity are 
determined by social and political determinants of health than by 
curative care.  Moreover, across these countries, structural 
innovations in the wave of new constitutions and reforms have 
deeply impacted how health rights have come to be interpreted 
and enforced by courts.  These have included two or more of the 
following aspects: (a) the establishment of a “constitutional 
jurisdiction,” sometimes with a high court or specialized chamber 
of a high court overseeing it; (b) the introduction or modification of 
protection writs (e.g., amparos, tutelas) as a mechanism to protect 
and promote the rights endowed in the constitution; (c) the 
incorporation of international human rights norms and standards 
through a constitutional bloc; (d) the expansion of abstract review 
of legislation; and (e) the reduction or virtual abolition of standing 
requirements.13  The development of jurisprudence on the right to 
                                                             
 12 Colombia T-760/08, supra note 9. 
 13 Alicia E. Yamin, Decision T-760 (2008) (Colom), in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (last updated Nov. 2017) at 
¶ 7, 9–10 [hereafter Yamin T-760/08]. 
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health has been further enabled by a reduction in formalism on the 
bench, reflected both in substantive erosions of distinctions 
between directive principles and fundamental rights as well as in 
practices regarding, e.g., amicus curiae. 
2.1.  Argentina 
Argentina has a federal system of government, and health is 
regulated at both the national and provincial levels.  The military 
dictatorship in Argentina (1976-83) incurred $36 billion in foreign 
debt,14 and subsequent democratic governments implemented 
structural adjustment programs to pay off national debt until the 
government defaulted in 2001.15  Both the structural adjustment 
and the default, and subsequent “Corralito,” had substantial 
impacts on the health system.16  According to UN Independent 
Expert Cephas Lumina, the crisis “severely affected the public 
health system, with hospitals suffering a serious shortage of basic 
supplies and prices of medicines soaring.  In addition, the drastic 
drop in employment left roughly 60 per cent of the population 
outside the social health insurance system.”17  The current health 
system is composed of public, social (a contributory regime for 
those in formal employment based upon a social insurance 
package), and private health sectors; and in practice is fragmented 
to the point of what has been called “atomization,” which produces 
inequities across plans and providers.18 
                                                             
 14 International Monetary Fund, The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002, 
Issues Paper/Terms of Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent 
Evaluation Office (July 2003), 
https://www.imf.org/External/NP/ieo/2003/arg/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/95LF-SL7H]. 
 15 See Rep. of the Indep. Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt and Other 
Related Int’l Financial Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment of all Hum. 
Rts., particularly Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/50/Add. 3, 
at 6–14 (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.undocs.org/A/HRC/25/50/Add.3 
[https://perma.cc/XDH7-T9Y2] (describing the transformation of Argentina’s 
economy in 2001, key challenges and implications, and obligations under human 
rights law). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 6 ¶13. 
 18 Cf., Thomas Bossert et al., Comparative Review of Health System Integration in 
Selected Countries in Latin America, INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK [IDB] 
TECHNICAL NOTE IDB-TN-585 (Jan. 2014), 
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Social rights were initially embedded in the 1949 Constitution 
under Juan Domingo Perón, reflecting the strong influence of the 
labor movement under Peronism at the time.  In the 1957 text, 
Article 14 bis, incorporated social constitutionalism, which 
established a “Social Security” system that included both 
traditional social security and a broader concept of social 
protection.19  However, it was through constitutional amendments 
introduced in 1994 that announced equality and social justice as 
organizing principles for the state, and gave human rights treaties 
constitutional status through Article 75.22.20 
The current constitutional protection of the right to health 
extends well beyond medical care.  For example, the constitution 
protects the collective right to “a healthy and balanced 
environment for human development” (Article 41) and consumers’ 
rights “to the protection of their health, safety, and economic 
interests” (Article 43).  Further, Article 75 mandates the Legislature 
to provide certain health and other social protections on the basis 
of social equality (Article 75), understood as including both formal 
and substantive dimensions.21 
The Argentine Supreme Court has recognized the 
constitutional status of the right to health as a result of the 
constitutional bloc.22  The Court has cited international norms in 
                                                             
https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/6024/Technical%20Note
%20585-%20Health%20System%20Fragmentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/RR9K-
884G]  (exploring the fragmentation of Latin American health systems across six 
countries, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico; however 
commenting on Juan-Luis Londono and Julio Frenk’s framework for 
understanding Latin American health systems which describes Argentina’s as an 
“atomize private model”). 
 19 Art. 14, Constitución Nacional [CONST. NAC.] [NATIONAL CONSTITUTION] 
(Arg.). 
 20 See Paola Bergallo, Argentina: Courts and the Right to Health: Achieving 
Fairness Despite “Routinization” in Individual Coverage Cases?, in LITIGATING HEALTH 
RIGHTS: CAN COURTS BRING MORE JUSTICE TO HEALTH?, 43–75 (Alicia Ely. Yamin & 
Siri Gloppen eds., 2011) [hereinafter Bergallo LHR] (noting how the 1994 
amendments introduced new institutions for the protection of social rights with 
specific implications for the right to health, and how the right to health was 
further defined by references to human rights treaties which were included in 
Article 75.22). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM] [National Supreme Court 
of Justice] 24/10/2000, Ana Carina Campodónico de Beviacqua c. Ministerio de 
Salud y Acción Social – Secreteria de Programas de Salud y Banco de Drogas 
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support of protecting against unilateral termination of health 
services by different health insurers, including private ones,23 in 
enforcing obligations to guarantee access to treatment,24 and 
holding that the federal government is a subsidiary guarantor in 
various cases against provincial public contributory insurers.25  The 
Court has also addressed the protection of the right to health in 
relation to vulnerable groups, such as children,26 persons with 
disabilities,27 people with severe diseases,28 and socially 
marginalized communities.29 
Paola Bergallo argues that courts’ increased involvement in 
health in particular can be attributed not just to legal 
developments, but also the failures of political organs of 
government to respond to regulatory and oversight failure in the 
fragmented health sector.  Bergallo explains the amparo cases 
clustering around demands for certain treatments or services.30  As 
a result of regulatory failure, these clusters have emerged around 
disputes over coverage for a particular illness or a particular group 
of patients, as well as around particular insurer defendants.31 
                                                             
Neoplásicas, (Arg.), https://sj.csjn.gov.ar/sj/tomosFallos.do?method=iniciar 
[https://perma.cc/7KF6-32SU] [hereinafter Campodónico CSJN]. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM] [National Supreme Court 
of Justice], 1/6/2000, Asociación Benghalensis y Otros c. Ministerio de Salud y 
Acción Social – Estado Nacional, A. 186 (Arg.). 
 25 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM] [National Supreme Court 
of Justice],  21/8/2003, Neira, Luis Manuel y Otra c. Swiss Medical Group S.A., 
(Arg.); Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM] [National Supreme Court 
of Justice], 8/6/2004, Martín, Sergio Gustavo y Otros c. Fuerza Aérea (Arg.). 
 26 Campodónico CSJN, supra note 22. 
 27 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM] [National Supreme Court 
of Justice], 1/10/2001, Monteserín, Marcelino c. Estado Nacional – Ministerio de 
Salud y Acción Social – Comisión Nacional Asesora para la Integración de 
Personas Discapacitadas – Servicio Nacional de Rehabilitación y Promoción de la 
Persona con Discapacidad, (Arg.). 
 28 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM] [National Supreme Court 
of Justice], Dec. 18, 2004, Asociación de Esclerosis Múltiple de Salta c. Ministerio 
de Salud – Estado Nacional (Arg.), Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM] 
[National Supreme Court of Justice], 28/8/2007, Cambiaso Péres de Nealón, Celia 
María Ana y Otros c. Centro de Educación Médica e Investigaciones Médicas 
(Arg.). 
 29 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM] [National Supreme Court 
of Justice], 18/9/2007, Defensor del Pueblo de la Nación c. Estado Nacional y Otra 
(Provincia del Chaco) s. proceso de conocimiento (Arg.). 
 30 Bergallo LHR supra note 20, at 60. 
 31 Id. 
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At the same time, other authors point to significant structural 
precedents going beyond medical treatment and to precedents that 
have utilized dialogical remedies.  In the early case of Viceconte,32 
public interest litigation sought to require the state to provide a 
vaccine against the Argentine hemorrhagic fever that threatened 
the lives of 3.5 million people, most of whom did not have access to 
preventive medical services.33  The Federal Administrative Court of 
Appeals ultimately ordered the government to designate funds for 
completing the vaccination campaign and ensuring the production 
of the vaccine, put a follow-up framework in place to oversee 
compliance with its ruling, and established a deadline for the state 
to meet the requirements.34 
In a case involving the cleanup of the highly polluted Matanza-
Riachuelo River Basin,35 the Argentine Supreme Court issued a 
dialogical decision that established benchmarks and a timeline for 
cleanup of the river basin, but left significant discretion to the 
various agencies involved.  The court also created a compliance 
authority to manage all the activities triggered by a decision, 
giving both civil society organizations and ordinary residents of 
the affected area a voice and a place to be heard.36  Nevertheless, 
after ten years, implementation has been less than satisfactory.37  
                                                             
 32 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo 
Federal, Sala IV (CNFed.) [National Court of Appeals in Federal and 
Administrative Litigation of the Federal Capital: Court of Appeals in 
Administrative Matters], 2/6/1998, Viceconte, Mariela C. c. Ministerio de Salud y 
Acción Social La Ley [L.L.] (1998-F-305) (Arg.) 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM] [National Supreme Court 
of Justice], 8/7/2008, Mendoza Beatriz Silvia y Otros c. Estado Nacional y Otros s. 
Daños y Perjuicios, (Arg.). 
 36 See generally Daniel M. Brinks, Varun Gauri & Kyle Shen, Social Rights 
Constitutionalism: Negotiating the Tension Between the Universal and the Particular, 11 
Ann. Rev. of L. and Soc. Sci. 289, 289–308 (2015), 
https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110413-030654 
(discussing court monitoring/compliance efforts work to the extent that they 
create new spaces for political mobilization). 
 37 See Roberto Gargarella, Deliberative Democracy, Dialogic Justice and the 
Promise of Social and Economic Rights, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 105, 115 (Helena Alivar Garcia, Karl Klare & Lucy A. 
Williams eds., 2016) (noting a mismatch in progressive social right protections and 
their implementation due to an outdated and inefficient constitutional structure 
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Indeed, the court has recently called attention to a number of 
deficiencies that continue to hinder implementation efforts during 
a public hearing, including the failure of multijurisdictional 
agency, ACUMAR (Authority of the Matanza-Riachuelo River 
Basin) to integrate human rights and environmental protection 
concerns sufficiently in its work.38 
2.2.  Brazil 
Brazil is a Federal Republic that stands out in the region both 
for the scope and specificity of the right to health in its 1988 post-
dictatorship Constitution, as well as for the Unified Health System 
(SUS, for its acronym in Portuguese) created under that 
constitution.  The country’s deep health inequities increased under 
the dictatorship.  For example, while children in the lowest wealth 
quintile were 4.9 times more likely to be stunted than those from 
families in the highest wealth quintile in 1974-75, this ratio 
increased to 7.7 by the late 1980’s.39  The creation of the SUS, 
including innovative mechanisms for citizen participation40, was an 
integral part of the struggle for democratization in Brazil.41  In 
contrast to Argentina, however, despite the incorporation of 
international human rights norms into national law through the 
constitution, relevant treaties have not been cited to extend the 
contours of the right to health. 
Health was recognized as a fundamental right in the 
Constitution of 1988, under Title II.  Article 6 states: “education, 
health, work, housing, leisure, security, social security, protection 
                                                             
and divisions between the branches of government) [hereafter Gargarella 
Deliberative Democracy]. 
 38 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM] [National Supreme Court 
of Justice], 27/12/2016, “Mendoza Beatriz Silvia y otros c. Estadio Nacional y otros s/ 
daños y perjuicios, Fallos (2016-339-1795) (Arg). 
 39 Cesar G. Victoria et al., Maternal and Child Health in Brazil: Progress and 
Challenges, 377 THE LANCET 1863, 1869–76 (2011) (discussing how Brazil has 
undergone rapid changes in major social determinants of health and in the 
organization of health services). 
 40 Armando De Negri Filho, Brazil: A Long Journey towards a Universal 
Healthcare System, in ADVANCING THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH 173–80 (2013). 
 41 Anne-Emmanuelle Birn & Laura Nervi, Political Roots of the Struggle for 
Health Justice in Latin America, 385 THE LANCET 1174, 1174–5 (2015) (discussing how 
Brazil’s health reform, is directly linked to the re-democratization movement). 
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of motherhood and childhood, and assistance to the destitute, are 
social rights under this Constitution.”  The right to health must be 
interpreted in light of Articles 196 to 200, which inter alia, state 
clearly that health is to be guaranteed “by means of social and 
economic policies aimed at reducing the risk of illness and other hazards 
and at the universal and equal access to actions and services for its 
promotion, protection and recovery . . . .” 42  Thus, the right to health is 
defined broadly, beyond medical care to include actions and 
policies involving “social and economic policies” in general 
(Article 196), as well as public health measures such as 
“preventative activities” (Article 198), “sanitary and 
epidemiological actions,” “health of workers,” and “preservation 
of the environment” (Article 200). 
A small fraction of the litigation relating to health in Brazil does 
relate to pre-conditions of health, such as sanitation.43  While 
sanitation is a compulsory public service in Brazil, the constitution 
does not establish a specific right to such services.  Instead, Brazil’s 
courts have referred to a right to sanitation services as a social and 
economic right, tying it to the Brazilian constitution’s health rights 
(Articles 6 and 196), environmental rights (Article 225) and, in 
some cases, housing rights (Article 6).44  However, while there is 
evidence that the courts have favored public health policies 
granting sanitation services and that their decisions have fostered 
greater political priority on sanitation, these decisions addressed 
only a small part of the country’s need for sanitation services.45 
Health rights litigation in Brazil, as elsewhere in the region, has 
concentrated overwhelmingly on individual access to medical care 
and, in particular, medications.  Indeed, the great preponderance 
of the tens of thousands of health rights claims have involved the 
use of provisional protection measures to provide access to 
                                                             
 42 Art. 196 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [Constitution] (Braz.). 
 43 Ana P. de Barcellos, Sanitation Rights, Public Law Litigation, and Inequality: 
A Case Study from Brazil, 16(2) H. AND HUM. R. J. 35, 37–38 (2014) (discussing how 
litigation has addressed fewer than 177 out of the 2,495 Brazilian municipalities 
that lack both sewage collection and treatment systems, and lawsuits are 
concentrated in the richer cities, not in the poorest ones). 
 44 Id. at 37. 
 45 Id. at 42. 
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individual entitlements.46  And nowhere are the equity impacts of 
judicial enforcement of health rights more contested than in Brazil.  
Octavio Motta Ferraz has written that judicialization has favored 
the middle class and expensive medications, and has undermined 
notions of formal equality in the Brazilian constitution by fostering 
queue jumping.47  Joseph Amon and Joao Biehl have contested 
critiques of judicialization as largely “myths” and have argued that 
findings of benefits going to the middle class should simply spur 
greater efforts at equal access to justice rather than restrictions on 
judicial enforcement.48  Mariana Mota Prado notes that the debates 
over equitable impact of the granting of entitlements obscures 
another important aspect of judicial enforcement, which is greater 
accountability and oversight in the complex Brazilian health 
system.49  Although Brazil has a unified health system, the 
differentiated responsibilities of the federal, state, and municipal 
governments, as well as increasing privatization and failure to 
establish parameters for convênios with the private sector, 
undermine both equity and accountability.50 
The politicized nature of judicialization of health rights has led 
the judiciary and legislature to take certain measures recently.  In 
2011, Federal Act 12401 was passed calling for treatment to be 
provided according to health system protocols and establishing a 
new National Council for the Incorporation of Technologies 
(CONITEC, by its acronym in Portuguese). 
                                                             
 46 Octavio L.M. Ferraz, The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil: Worsening 
Health Inequities?, 11 H. AND HUM. R. J. 33–45 (2013) (discussing how the majority 
right-to-health cases in Brazil to date have been filed by individual claimants and 
have concerned the provision of curative medical treatment) [hereinafter Ferraz 
HHRJ]. 
 47 Octavio L.M. Ferraz et al., Judging the Price of Life: Cost Considerations in 
Right to Health Litigation, in  JURIDIFICATION AND SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE WELFARE 
STATE, 121–45 (2014). 
 48 João Biehl, Mariana P. Socal & Joseph J. Amon, The Judicialization of Health 
and the Quest for State Accountability: Evidence from 1,262 Lawsuits for Access to 
Medicines in Southern Brazil, 18(1) H. AND HUM. R. J. 209–20 (2016) (discussing how 
judicialization may serve as a grassroots instrument for the poor to hold the state 
accountable). 
 49 Mariana Mota Prado, The Debatable Role of Courts in Brazil’s Health Care 
System: Does Litigation Harm or Help? 41(1) THE J. OF L. MED. & ET. 124–37 (2013) 
(discussing about the right to health litigation in Brazil which could be generating 
policy and institutional changes within the health care system). 
 50 Maria I. BRAVO, ET AL., A MERCANTILIZAÇÃO DA SAÚDE EM DEBATE: AS 
ORGANIZAÇÃO SOCIAIS NO RIO DE JANEIRO. (UERJ: Cadernos de Saúde Pública 2015). 
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In 2014, the Superior Court of Justice, denied an ordinary 
appeal based on the fact that “registration with ANVISA is a 
necessary condition to benefit from the product, being the first 
requirement for the SUS to consider its incorporation” and 
therefore, “in general, the treatment provided by the SUS should 
be privileged rather than a different option chosen by the patient, 
whenever the ineffectiveness or impropriety of the existing health 
policy is not proven.”51  The Supreme Federal Tribunal had been 
seeking to unify two judgments, one involving a treatment that has 
not yet been registered by the Brazilian Sanitary Authority 
(ANVISA, for its acronym in Portuguese) and one involving a high 
cost treatment not yet incorporated by the Public Health System. 52  
The judgment, which was temporarily suspended by a justice who 
later died in a plane crash, would unify standards for granting 
health entitlements that are not approved by the relevant executive 
branch authorities.  Nevertheless, on April 26, 2017, the Superior 
Court of Justice (below the Supreme Federal Tribunal) ordered the 
suspension of proceedings in cases where the medicine was not 
incorporated in the SUS.53 
2.3.  Colombia 
Colombia’s Constitution, adopted in 1991, enshrines principles 
of transformative constitutionalism, including a “social state of 
law.”54  However, Article 49 of the constitution defined health care, 
as well as social security, not as a right but as a public service, to be 
regulated, controlled and overseen by the state, yet open to the 
participation of private capital.55  Since the adoption of the 
                                                             
 51 Superior Tribunal de Justiça [STJ] [Superior Justice Tribunal] Apr. 23, 
2015, Recurso em Mandado de Segurança, RO 2014/0130056-0, No. 45.703 (Braz.). 
 52 Supremo Tribunal Federal [STF] [Supreme Federal Court] May 13, 2010, 
Recurso Extraordinário, RE 566471, No. 86/2010 (Braz.); Supremo Tribunal 
Federal [STF] [Supreme Federal Court] Nov. 17, 2011, Recurso Extraordinário RG 
657718 MG (Braz.). 
 53 Superior Tribunal de Justiça [STJ] [Superior Justice Tribunal] Recurso 
Especial, RJ 2017/0025629-7, No. 1657156 (Braz.). 
 54 See Yamin T-760/08, supra note 13, at ¶ 6 (describing the basis and 
principles upon which Colombia’s Constitution of 1991 was founded upon). 
 55 Art. 49 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] [Political Constitution 
of Colombia] July 4, 1991; see also Everaldo Lamprea, Colombia’s Right-to-Health 
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constitution, Colombia’s newly-created Constitutional Court has 
actively shaped enforcement of the right to health and health 
policy through a more engaged and less formalistic adjudication.56 
In 1993, the enactment of Law 100 initiated a major reform of 
Colombia’s health system, introducing a two-tiered system of 
benefits, based upon an obligatory social insurance scheme tied to 
managed care: a contributory regime for those in the formal sector 
(POS-C) and a subsidized regime (POS-S), which contained 
approximately half the benefits.57  Law 100 greatly increased 
formal coverage.58  However, regulatory failure and fragmentation 
between its main oversight bodies plagued Colombia’s health 
system, making it difficult for the state to oversee the wide array of 
private and public actors involved in operationalizing the complex 
new system. 59 
The evolution of judicial interpretation and enforcement of the 
right to health in Colombia can be divided into four periods: 1) a 
first phase characterized by generous court judgments related to 
the right to health; 2) a second phase during which the use of 
tutelas exploded; 3) the structural approach to the right to health in 
judgment T-760/2008;60 and 4) subsequent developments, 
including the enactment of a new Statutory Framework Law on 
Health based on the state’s obligations to respect, protect, and 
fulfill the right to health. 
                                                             
Litigation in a Context of Health Care Reform, in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AT THE 
PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 131 (Colleen M. Flood & 
Aeyal Gross eds., 2014) [hereinafter Lamprea 2014] (discussing the involvement of 
private insurance companies in Colombia’s public health insurance system). 
 56 See Manuel J. Cepeda, Transcript: Social and Economic Rights and the 
Colombian Constitutional Court, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1699, 1700–1705 (2011) (discussing 
the impact of the decision T-7606 of 2008 on the right to health). 
 57 L. 100/93, diciembre 23, 1993, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.). 
 58 See Lamprea 2015, supra note 6, at xii, 64 (detailing the massive increase in 
formal health insurance coverage of Colombian citizens following the passage of 
Ley 100 of 1993). 
 59 Alicia E. Yamin, Oscar Parra-Vera & Camila Gianella, Colombia: Judicial 
Protection of the Right to Health: An Elusive Promise?, in LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS: 
CAN COURTS BRING MORE JUSTICE TO HEALTH? 103, 110 (Alicia E. Yamin & Siri 
Gloppen eds., 2011) [hereafter Yamin Colombia LHR]. 
 60 César Rodríguez-Garavito, The Judicialization of Health Care: Symptoms, 
Diagnosis, and Prescriptions, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT OF MIDDLE-INCOME 
COUNTRIES: AVOIDING THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP, 246–269 (Randall Peerenboom & 
Tom Ginsburg eds., 2014) [hereinafter Rodríguez-Garavito 2014] (describing the 
shift away from mass litigation towards structural reform following the T-760/08 
decision to resolve issues surrounding the right to health). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss3/4
2019] The Right to Heath in Latin America 711 
 
The Constitutional Court’s early rulings relied upon a doctrine 
of “fundamental rights by virtue of connection” (doctrina de 
conexidad) to hold that despite being a directive principle, the right 
to health could be claimed before courts when the lack of a good or 
service endangered the life of the claimant or the possibility to lead 
a dignified life, despite being a directive principle.  The court also 
held the right to health, enforceable in cases involving a person or 
group of people in especially vulnerable circumstances, or a claim 
for health care defined in the POS.61  It is important to note that the 
court issued opinions that went beyond individual entitlements, 
considering proposed budget cuts to the subsidized regime, 
eligibility requirements for establishing indigence, definitions of 
comprehensive care, and protections from interruption of 
coverage.62 
However, by 2008, courts throughout the country had become 
an essential “escape valve” for individual Colombians who were 
denied access to medicines, surgeries, and treatments by a health 
system incapable of regulating itself.63  The Human Rights 
Ombuds Office calculated that between 1999 and 2008 individuals 
presented 674,612 tutelas relating to health rights.64  Both the 
Human Rights Ombuds Office and the non-governmental 
organization, DeJusticia, called for the court to step in and declare 
an “unconstitutional state of affairs.”65 
In 2008, a specialized review chamber of the Constitutional 
Court issued judgment T-760/08, which resolved twenty-two 
individual tutelas that represented systematic failures, and called 
for structural reforms in the health system.  The orders, which 
largely reiterated and synthesized prior jurisprudence and were 
based upon existing legislative frameworks, included: updating the 
                                                             
 61 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 11, 1992, 
Sentencia T-484/92, Relatoría de la Corte Constitucional No. 2130 (Colom.). 
 62 See Corte Constitucional [CC] [Constitutional Court], septiembre 6, 2000, 
Sentencia C-1165/00, Relatoría de la Corte Constitucional No. D-2873) (Colom.) 
(discussing how budget cuts in the POS-S constitute an impermissible 
retrogression, and the budget was subsequently revised.). 
 63 Yamin T-760/08, supra note 13, at ¶ 22. 
 64 Yamin Colombia LHR, supra note 59, at 113. 
 65 PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA NACIÓN & DEJUSTICIA, EL DERECHO A LA 
SALUD EN PERSPECTIVA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS Y EL SISTEMA DE INSPECCIÓN, 
VIGILANCIA Y CONTROL DEL ESTADO COLOMBIANO EN MATERIA DE QUEJAS EN SALUD 
11 (2008). 
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bundles of health benefits and achieving universal coverage, 
progressively unifying the subsidized, and contributory insurance 
regimes to improve the health system’s reimbursement procedures.  
The court also called for greater oversight of different insurance 
companies (EPS, for their acronym in Spanish) and administrative 
mechanisms aimed at resolving disputes.66 
The decision adopted what Roberto Gargarella describes as a 
“dialogical understanding” of the system of checks and balances.67  
While the court set broad goals and implementation pathways, set 
deadlines and included the need for progress reports, it left 
substantive decisions and detailed outcomes to governmental 
agencies.68  Based on the example of a previous case relating to 
Internally Displaced Persons (T 025/04), the court established a 
follow-up unit to gather information, monitor compliance with the 
decision’s orders, and organize public hearings for issues relating 
to the orders.69  In 2015, in the wake of T-760/08, Colombia’s 
Congress passed the Statutory Framework Law (Law 1751), which 
places the right to health at the center of the health system.70  
Nevertheless, individual health rights litigation in Colombia 
remains intense.71 
                                                             
 66 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 31, 2008, 
Sentencia T-760/08, Relatoría de la Corte Constitucional (Colom.) (reasserting the 
right to health and detailing types of regulation necessary to maintain this right).  
See also Yamin T-760/08, supra note 13, at ¶23–6, 45 (describing the Constitutional 
Court’s ruling that the executive and legislative branches reform the health 
industry and the steps taken by the Santos administration following this ruling to 
provide further oversight). 
 67 Gargarella Deliberative Democracy, supra note 37, at 105. 
 68 See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public 
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117, HARV. L. R. 1030, 1016–1100 (2004) (discussing the 
transformation of the government’s function from provider to guarantor of care). 
 69 See Lamprea 2015, supra note 6, at 88 (describing the special three 
magistrate chamber process similar to the one used in T 025/04 assigned to 
provide oversight). 
 70 L. 1751/15, febrero 16, 2015, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.). 
 71 See Defensoría del Pueblo de Colombia, Sigue Creciendo el Número de 
Tutelas en Salud, DEFENSORÍA DEL PUEBLO COLOMBIA (Apr. 7, 2015), 
http://www.defensoria.gov.co/es/nube/noticias/3414/Sigue-creciendo-el-
n%C3%BAmero-de-tutelas-en-salud-Tutelas-salud-D%C3%ADa-Mundial-de-la-
salud-justicia-Plan-Obligatorio-de-Salud-Fallos-de-tutela-Derechos-Humanos-
EPS.htm) [https://perma.cc/5B2C-D6XC] (detailing a report by the 
Ombudsman’s Office regarding an increase in health-related legal action between 
2013 and 2014). 
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2.4.  Costa Rica 
Compared with other countries in the region, Costa Rica’s 
health statistics reflect fewer disparities.  Yet, by comparison with 
international standards, the country still has a high degree of 
income inequality (GINI 50.69 in 2015),72 which translates into 
differential health outcomes and health gaps.  There are major 
challenges in terms of skilled health professional’s density, which 
is why efforts should be made to increase the expenditure on 
health research and development, considering it is one of the 
lowest in the world.73  Costa Rica’s health system is composed of a 
public and a private sector.  The public sector is mainly based on a 
social insurance scheme provided through the Caja Costarricense de 
Seguro Social (CCSS), an autonomous institution in charge of 
financing, purchasing, and delivering health services.  For its part, 
the private sector includes ambulatory and hospital care services, 
which are financed mostly out-of-pocket or with insurance 
premiums.74 
The constitution, which dates from 1949, contains an extensive 
list of civil and political rights, but not social rights.75  The right to 
health is a derived right, constructed from the right to life (Article 
21) and the right to social security (Article 73).76   
Judicial enforcement of health rights was enabled by a 1989 
constitutional amendment that added a seven-member 
constitutional chamber to the existing three chambers of the Costa 
Rican Supreme Court (Sala IV) and amended Article 48 to include a 
                                                             
 72 Inter-American Development Bank, supra note 1 (indicating the per capita 
household income for Latin American countries). 
 73 World Health Organization [WHO], World Health Statistics 2016: 
Monitoring Health for the SDGs, Sustainable Development Goals 79 (2016) 
http://www.who.int/gho/publications/world_health_statistics/2016/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/6JAG-QX6K]. 
 74 See María del Rocío Sáenz et al., The Health System of Costa Rica, 53 SALUD 
PÚBLICA DE MEX., 5156, 5156–7 (2011) (discussing how the private sector includes a 
broad set of services offering ambulatory and hospital care). 
 75 See generally Constitución Política de Costa Rica [C.P.C.R.] Nov. 7, 1949. 
 76 See Bruce M. Wilson, Costa Rica: Health Rights Litigation: Causes and 
Consequences, in LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS: CAN COURTS BRING MORE JUSTICE TO 
HEALTH? 132, 142 (Alicia Ely Yamin & Sirir Gloppen eds., 2011) [hereinafter 
Wilson LHR] (explaining that the 1949 Costa Rican Constitution lacks an explicit 
right to health). 
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constitutional bloc, giving international human rights treaties the 
same force as constitutional law, along with Articles 10, 105 and 
128.77   
Bruce Wilson argues that unlike the prior supreme court, the 
Sala IV used its centralized judicial review powers to abandon the 
legal formalism of the earlier court, and to assertively enforce 
individual rights, including health-related rights, through its 
interpretation of the right to life.78  The enabling law that 
accompanied the creation of the Sala IV (Ley de la Jurisdicción 
Constitucional), not only mandated the court to guarantee the 
supremacy of the norms and constitutional principles, international 
law, and communal law in force, as well as their uniform 
interpretation and application, it also removed virtually all barriers 
to accessing the court.79 
The role of the Sala IV in expanding and enhancing the 
understanding of health rights has been significant.  Through its 
rulings it has imposed and delineated the Caja’s way towards the 
full enjoyment of health rights.  For instance, the Sala IV has 
regularly ruled in favor of transplant patients, antiretroviral 
coverage for HIV/AIDS patients and keeping clinics open that the 
Caja wanted to close.  Indeed, the ability of marginalized 
individuals and organizationally weak groups in Costa Rica, 
including LGBT groups, to seek protection and enforcement of 
their constitutional rights made this judicial avenue particularly 
attractive.  As Wilson writes: 
[O]nce the court had constructed a fundamental right to 
health—and once it became clear that the Caja 
Costarricense routinely complied with the court’s rulings—
the legal opportunity structure became increasingly 
obvious . . . .  While the average success rate for amparo 
cases is approximately 25%, the success rate in recent years 
for health rights amparo claims against the Caja is over 
60%.80 
                                                             
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 138 (suggesting that the judicial resolution to disputes involving 
rights violations increased the court’s caseload). 
 80 Id. at 140–1. 
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2.5.  Mexico 
From the time of the Mexican Revolution, health has been 
addressed in relation to agrarian reform, the establishment of social 
security and labor protections, and ambiguous efforts concerning 
the status of indigenous groups.  The health system was 
historically based upon segmented schemes for those employed in 
formal and informal sectors, with a few special regimes, e.g. for the 
military.  In 2003, the program Seguro Popular at least formally 
created universal social protection and health coverage.  The 
architect of the Seguro Popular and Minister of Health at the time, 
Julio Frenk, stated: 
The shift in power [in the election of President Vicente Fox 
from the opposition, PAN] that took place in 2000 was an 
indication that Mexico had made major progress in the 
exercise of civil and political rights.  The following step was 
to reduce inequalities by creating the conditions for the 
universal and effective exercise of social rights, including 
the right to health care.81 
Nonetheless, inequalities and segmentation persist in Mexico’s 
health system and reflect those of the overall society.82 
The Mexican Constitution of 1917 is often considered as a font 
of social constitutionalism in the region, as well as the inspiration 
for many of the economic and social rights provisions in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.83  It was the first 
                                                             
 81 See Julio Frenk & Octavio Gómez-Dantés, Ethical and Human Rights 
Foundations of Health Policy: Lessons from Comprehensive Reform in Mexico, 17(2) H. 
AND HUM. RTS. J. 31, 33–37 (2015) (discussing the “democratization of health”). 
 82 Inter-American Development Bank, supra note 1; see also WHO, Global 
Health Observatory: México: Country Profiles, (2011), 
http://www.who.int/gho/countries/mex/country_profiles/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/RN9A-ZRPL]. 
 83 See Roberto Gargarella, Latin American Constitutionalism: Social Rights and 
the “Engine Room” of the Constitution, 4, NOTRE DAME J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 9, 12–18, 
(2014) (describing the engine room which consists of the power-granting 
provisions of the constitution that determine the relative authority of 
governmental actors). 
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constitution in the world to include justiciable social rights, 
including health and a healthy environment (Article 4).84 
The Constitution established that: “Every person has the right 
to health protection.  The law shall determine the bases and terms 
to access health services and shall establish the competence of the 
Federation and the Local Governments in regard to sanitation.”85  
It also explicitly protects the right to health for children and 
indigenous people.  In the 1980’s, through legislation creating the 
social security institute, Article 4 came to be understood as an 
individual right. 
Articles 103 and 107 of the constitution establish writs of amparo 
as a means of seeking protection of constitutional rights.86  Amparo 
extends, but is not limited, to the first 29 Articles of the Mexican 
Constitution, which include the right to health.  It also extends to 
human rights enshrined in international treaties, through a 
constitutional bloc incorporated via the 2011 amendment to the 
constitution.  However, Article 1 stipulates that these treaties are 
incorporated to the extent they do not contradict the Mexican 
Constitution.87  The 2011 amendment also expanded standing to 
bring an amparo to any party with a legitimate interest (“interés 
legítimo v interés jurídico”), whether individual or collective.88 
These recent structural reforms in the Constitution, following a 
significant reform of the judiciary in 1994, were instrumental in 
enabling what Justice Gutierrez Ortiz Mena has described as “a 
new attitude” on the Mexican Supreme Court (and in turn other 
courts), which construed the constitution as enforceable law, as 
opposed to a political text.  The Radilla Pacheco case, an enforced 
disappearance case in which the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights declared the national government of México responsible for 
sub-national failures, also came to be an inflection point in regard 
                                                             
 84 See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [CPEUM], Arts. 
3, 4, 5 and 123, feb. 2, 1917. 
 85 Id. at art. 4 (4). 
 86 Id. at arts. 103 and 107. 
 87 Id. at art. 1. 
 88 Id., at art. 107(I) (mandating that the constitutional adjudication (appeal on 
the grounds of unconstitutionality) shall be carried out at the request of the 
offended party.  The offended party is the holder of an individual or collective 
right, which has been violated by the challenged act, affecting his/her legal 
framework, either directly or by the means of his/her special situation before the 
legal system.). 
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to the incorporation of federal constitutional principles to states 
and the supremacy of national laws.89 
In recent years, the court has decided cases relating to 
regulation of products affecting health,90 decriminalization of 
abortion,91 and access to entitlements.  For example, in 2014, the 
court considered two important cases.  In the Pabellón 13 case, the 
court granted an amparo in favor of three HIV/AIDS patients and 
concluded that the failure to execute the project for the 
construction of a specialized ward for HIV/AIDS was a violation 
of the right to health.92  Second, the court considered a lawsuit 
brought by seventeen patients that would have required the 
Mexican social security system, IMSS, to cover Soliris for a 
condition that some 250 patients have, at a cost of nearly $140 
million every year.93  The court did not rule that that the health 
system must pay for Soliris, noting that the drug had not yet gone 
through review by a commission that is charged with including or 
excluding drugs from the basic catalog of drugs.94  Arguably, the 
Mexican Supreme Court deferred to a commission that does not 
meet the requirements of a fair process, because it lacks adequate 
transparency and does not include a range of stakeholders in its 
deliberation.95  To date, unlike Colombia for example, the Mexican 
                                                             
 89 See Case of Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 209 
(Nov. 23, 2009). 
 90 Amparo en revisión, quejosos y recurrentes 237/2014. Pleno de la 
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación de México [CSJN], Semanario Judicial de 
la Federación del viernes 11 de julio de 2014 (Mex.); Amparo en Revisión 
350/2014, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación de México [CSJN], 
Semanario Judicial de la Federación de septiembre 17, 2014 (Mex.). 
 91 Acciones de inconstitucionalidad 146/2007 and 147/2007. Pleno de la 
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación de México [CSJN], Semanario Judicial de 
la Federación y su Gaceta, agosto 28, 2008 (Mex.). 
 92 Amparo en Revisión 378/2014, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la 
Nación de México [CSJN] Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, 
noviembre 14, 2014. (Mex.). 
 93 Amparo en Revisión 350/2014, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la 
Nación de México [CSJN], Semanario Judicial de la Federación de septiembre 17, 
2014 (Mex.). 
 94 Id. 
 95 See Norman Daniels et al., Role of the Courts in the Progressive Realization of 
the Right to Health: Between the Threat and the Promise of Judicialization in Mexico, 1 
HEALTH SYS. & REFORM 229, 232 (2015) (discussing the commission that was 
charged with including or excluding drugs from a basic catalog of drugs). 
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Supreme Court has not asked the Executive for rationale or 
reasoning underpinning legislation and regulations in relation to 
health.  In a 2015 lecture at Harvard, Justice Gutierrez Ortiz Mena 
argued that as a counter-majoritarian institution, the court may 
“jump-start” the political process, but it must not substitute for it.96 
3.  JUDICIALIZATION OF HEALTH RIGHTS:  FROM INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS 
TO DIALOGICAL REMEDIES 
Since the introduction of these new constitutions and 
amendments, the region has seen an unparalleled explosion of 
health rights litigation.  The volume of litigation has been greatest 
in Colombia, with 1,323,292 tutelas related to health filed between 
1999 and 2014, according to the Human Rights Ombuds office.97  
Notably, the number of tutelas filed each year increased from 
approximately 20,000 in 1999 to over 118,000 in 2014.98  In Brazil, 
there are an estimated 800,000 accumulated cases still pending 
from 2014 to 2017 at all levels (federal, state, and municipal) in 
courts across the country, and an estimated average of 200,000 new 
cases a year in each of the past four years.99 
In Costa Rica, approximately 19,000 health-related cases were 
filed before the Sala IV between 1989 and 2009.  While few health 
cases were filed initially during that timeframe, health-related 
cases rose at a much faster rate than the court’s total caseload after 
1999.100  In Argentina, the lack of systematic record-keeping makes 
it difficult to continuously tally cases.  However, a study done by 
Bergallo found 6,528 right to health claims filed between 1998 and 
                                                             
 96 Justice Alfredo Gutierrez Ortiz Mena, The Role of the Mexican Supreme 
Court in Mexico’s Democracy, lecture at David Rockefeller Center for Latin 
American Studies, Harvard University, (Dec. 4, 2015), (transcript available at 
https://drclas.harvard.edu/event/mexican-supreme-court) 
[https://perma.cc/GY6Z-2DES]. 
 97 DEFENSORÍA DEL PUEBLO OF COLOMBIA, LA TUTELA Y LOS DERECHOS A LA 
SALUD Y A LA SEGURIDAD SOCIAL 86 (Def. del Pueblo, 2015) [hereinafter Defensoría 
Colombia Tutela Salud]. 
 98 Id. 
 99 OCTAVIO LUIZ MOTTA FERRAZ, HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT  (forthcoming 
2019)(manuscript at 8–10, on file with author). 
 100 Wilson LHR, supra note 76, at 140. 
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2007, with the number per year tripling during that time (449 cases 
in 1998; 1,159 cases in 2007).101101 
A number of factors underlie the volume of health rights 
litigation, which stem from the health system as well as political 
and legal systems.  The health systems, although differing in their 
institutional arrangements, are characterized by ineffective 
oversight and regulation, and inadequate administrative dispute 
resolution mechanisms.  For example, in Colombia and Argentina, 
“quality-skimping”—i.e., where benefits included in the POS or 
PMO, respectively, are routinely denied—accounts for the majority 
of lawsuits.  Incentives created for providers and insurance 
companies, through a combination of inadequate pharmaceutical 
regulations and reimbursement procedures, also contribute both to 
the medications and services claimed, as well as compliance 
rates.102  These are more accurately understood as market failure 
and regulatory gap problems, and not “judicial activism.”103 
Further, administrative mechanisms for resolving disputes are 
often cumbersome or perceived as captured by insurance 
companies or governmental corruption.  For example, in Mexico, 
while the percentage of complaints related to discontent with 
health services received by CONAMED (National Commission of 
Medical Arbitration) has been relatively low, around 2%, public 
human rights bodies are receiving approximately 3,000 right to 
health protection complaints each year.104  According to the UN 
High Commissioner’s Mexico Office, because direct tools for 
demanding the right to health do not exist, individuals are instead 
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turning to the amparo mechanism for the realization of this right.105  
Similarly, the Scientific-Technical Committees which were created 
in Colombia through Law 1428 to resolve claims for services 
outside the obligatory insurance scheme were widely perceived as 
rubber-stamping insurance company decisions and had little 
impact on the use of tutelas.106 
Additionally, the combination of chronic political failure and 
extremely easy access to courts to resolve health claims (through 
protection writ mechanisms) has fostered an explosion in 
judicialization.  Legislatures are often perceived as transactional 
rather than representative, and there is high distrust of executive 
branches that are perceived as corrupt, ineffectual and 
politicized.107  It is worth pointing out for example that in 
Colombia the most litigated right is the “derecho a la petición” 
(right of petition) which is invoked when a bureaucrat fails to carry 
out his or her functions.108  On the other hand, extremely low 
financial, legal, and procedural barriers make pursuing health 
rights claims through the courts an appealing option.  In all of the 
countries discussed above, access to the courts is very easy, and 
people are guaranteed a decision within days.109 
Judicialization of health rights should not necessarily be 
celebrated.  The exploitation of “rights” for individual entitlements 
has the potential to exacerbate, rather than mitigate, underlying 
inequities associated with access to health services and treatments.  
More troubling than possible outliers, such as a 1997 Brazilian case 
involving treatment in the United States for Duschenne’s muscular 
dystrophy, is evidence that courts may be systematically 
exacerbating inequities.110  In Colombia, a study by Uprimny and 
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Duran found that 35.2% of tutelas have been brought by 53.11% of 
those affiliated with the subsidized regime (containing half the 
benefits) and 35.8% of tutelas brought by 46.89% of those affiliated 
with the contributory regime in 2012.111  Further, substantive 
equality in health is not just a matter of socio-economic inequality; 
it is also a matter of life chances determined by the severity of 
illness or condition.  In a study based on random sampling of cases 
decided by the Sala IV in Costa Rica, Norheim and Wilson found 
that 3% of awarded treatments and services to be “high priority” in 
accordance with generally accepted criteria of priority-setting, 
including the “worst off” in terms of severity of illness, while over 
70% would have been low priority.112  While the weightings of 
criteria may vary, the conclusions are troubling in that they suggest 
a distortion of budgetary priorities by the Caja. 
Further, the reduction of health rights to individual claims may 
skew policies and programs toward the subjects of litigation, and 
therefore, away from public health measures that have the 
potential to benefit the poor to a greater extent.  It also may reduce 
robust egalitarian aspirations of health—and in turn social—justice 
to minimal packages of care.113  High courts in the region have 
issued structural orders in health not only in response to a 
collective suit, but also in response to concerns about the inequity 
of individual concession of entitlements or the legitimate use of the 
judicial system, or sometimes both.  Such remedies—whether in 
the case of T-760/08 in Colombia or the Matanza-Riachuelo case in 
Argentina—are appropriate for systematic violations,114 where 
complex orders relating to institutions and processes are involved, 
rather than dictating specific outcomes.  Through dialogical 
remedies, courts may be better able to not only preserve their own 
constitutional legitimacy in addressing complex policy questions, 
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but also catalyzing democratic participation and dialogue between 
branches of government regarding spending priorities and critical 
health policy questions.115  No judgment relating to health rights 
has been more sweeping than T-760/08 in Colombia, which 
illustrates both the potential and challenges for dialogical justice in 
relation to health in the region. 
3.1.  The Potential and Challenges of Dialogical Remedies:  T-760/08 
The law that reformed Colombia’s health system in 1993, Law 
100, was a striking example not just of a wave of what Juan Arroyo 
has classified as “silent reforms” in health in the region, due to the 
lack of democratic discussion about them, but also of the 
dysfunction in the Colombian political and legislative arena.116  
Law 100 was defined and written by teams of technocrats and 
insulated from broad public debate.  The final law was rushed 
through the legislature, passed shortly before Christmas—
December 23, 1993—and implemented as quickly as possible 
through decrees, before a change of presidential administration 
would take place months later.117 
The benefits package was put together without a 
comprehensive epidemiological analysis of the needs of the 
population, the burden of disease or the institutional capacities of 
the health system, and were not systematically costed to calculate 
the capitation rates.  After 1993, the benefits package was amended 
in piecemeal fashion, largely in response to political pressures 
rather than empirical evidence.  Further, the managed competition 
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system adopted in Law 100 required a regulated market in which 
effective governmental agencies would guide the financing, 
organization, and service delivery in the health system to align 
with public interest.118  But policies to improve the efficiency and 
equity of the health system were not implemented; regulations 
regarding eligibility and updating of services were neglected; 
complaints were not addressed in a systematic manner.  In short, 
patients were left with no alternative but to use tutela writs.119 
After Law 100 was enacted, there were brief periods of social 
mobilization around health from workers and certain user groups, 
but a strong social movement around health has not been sustained 
through the years.120  This is partially due to the nature of the 
health sector, with its strongly organized financial actors and often 
poorly organized or fragmented groups of patients.  It is also due 
to the particular nature of Colombia, plagued by armed conflict, 
and other forms of violence as well as political capture, where 
outside of large urban areas social mobilization around health was 
scant to non-existent. 
Despite efforts by the Constitutional Court to unify 
jurisprudence and to emphasize policy criteria, two problems 
persisted: (1) the EPS were recalcitrant with respect to 
implementing the policies and interpretations of “integral care,” 
“continuous care,” etc. called for by the Court; and (2) lower courts 
that heard tutela cases throughout the country were not well-
equipped to determine whether medications and other treatments 
outside the defined obligatory benefit plan should be provided as a 
matter of right.121  In judgment T-760/08 the court moved from a 
case-by-case approach to a structural approach that focused on 
resolving the systematic failures underlying the avalanche of 
individual claims.122 
In the judgment, the court explicitly asserted that a structural 
approach to the health system’s failings was necessary because 
“the organs of government responsible for the regulation of the 
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health system have not adopted decisions that guarantee the right 
to health without having to seek recourse through the tutela.”123  
Notably absent in the expansive structural approach, however, is a 
gender perspective regarding the failures of the health system to 
respect and protect reproductive health, or the disproportionate 
burden on women of the two-tiered system given their dependence 
on male partners and predominantly  work in the informal 
sector.124 
Beyond resolving the twenty-two individual cases, the court 
addressed its diagnosis of the structure of the system, calling for 
remedies and reforms that included updating the bundles of health 
benefits, unifying the subsidized and contributory insurance 
regimes, improving the health system’s financial arrangements, 
and achieving universal coverage.125  The court further called for 
adequate information regarding the institutional performance of 
different insurance companies.126  Additionally, the court asked the 
other branches of government to design administrative 
mechanisms to resolve disputes in order to reduce the amount of 
litigation, as well as the denial of both services and information by 
providers and insurers.127 
As noted above, this judgment exemplifies Sabel and Simon’s 
theory of “experimentalist regulation.”128  In the opinion, the court 
established broad goals and implementation pathways, set 
deadlines, and included the need for progress reports, but 
importantly left substantive decisions and detailed outcomes to 
governmental agencies.129  This form of remedy not only arguably 
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preserves the democratic and institutional legitimacy of the 
judiciary better than command-and–control remedies, but also 
importantly avoids the possibility of serious judicial error in the 
interpretation of a specific aspect of the right to health. 
Citing the government’s failure to take steps toward a 
unification of the contributory and subsidized plans as mandated 
in Law 100, the court ordered the government to unify the POS-C 
and POS-S immediately for children and progressively, in keeping 
with available resources, for adults.130  However, it did not propose 
what goods and services would be included in a unified POS for 
adults, or automatically equate unification with equalization; 
rather, it left that to the relevant government agencies but 
stipulated that the process of devising a unification plan was to be 
participatory—including the medical and scientific community as 
well as users of the system—transparent in terms of its reasoning, 
and evidence-based.131 
The judgment established a monitoring process, modeled on an 
earlier judgment concerning internally displaced persons (IDPs), T-
025/2004, also authored by Justice Cepeda.132  The possibility of 
such a follow-up review was made possible by the tutela, although 
subsequent changes to the statute of the Constitutional Court in 
2015 make such a review chamber more difficult to establish in the 
future.  In 2009, only months after the judgment, Justice Cepeda 
finished his term on the court.133  The follow-up chamber and 
attendant follow-up unit were subsequently overseen by Justice 
Jorge Ivan Palacio. 
The developments after judgment T-760/08 have been shaped 
by conflict and cooperation among the Constitutional Court, the 
executive and legislative branches of government, and social 
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movements.  The Uribe administration (2002–2010) was openly 
resistant to the judgment.  Arguing that health rights litigation had 
brought about an imminent financial collapse of the health system, 
Uribe employed the extraordinary provisional powers of the 
constitution, and in December 2009 declared an economic state of 
emergency and issued 13 decrees that resulted in substantial 
changes to the immediate functioning of the health system.134 
The impact of the T-760/08 decision likely would not have 
been as great were it not for the Uribe administration’s autocratic 
response.  The decrees created an uproar among patients and 
medical associations, as well as the general public.  The decrees 
gave way to an unexpected level of protest that included doctors, 
medical students, health sector workers and middle-class 
contributors, whose benefits were significantly curtailed.135  
Importantly, these protests included people who were not typical 
social dissidents, such as physicians and members of the Catholic 
hierarchy.136  By February 2010, mass protests were taking place 
across Colombia using the slogan, “Health is not a favor; it is a 
right.”137 
Although scholars have debated the impact, breadth, and 
strength of the social movements, Uribe’s response arguably 
promoted greater social mobilization around health in Colombia.  
Suddenly, the wide range of stakeholders that advocated for health 
as a right were aligned and galvanized in their advocacy and 
actions, and those who defended the model of health as a 
commodity were more visible.  The Uribe administration’s reaction 
inspired the reorganization of civil society groups around health in 
the “Alianza Nacional por la Salud” (ANSA for their Spanish 
acronym).138 
In April 2010, in Judgment C-252/2010,139 the Constitutional 
Court declared the emergency decrees unconstitutional, except for 
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the tax measures that funneled more resources to the health 
sector.140  However, although the decrees were declared 
unconstitutional, society’s response to the decrees showed how 
important the right to health and the tutela were to Colombians.141  
The Uribe government also paid a high political price for the 
emergency decrees.142 
Between 2008 and 2016 the court’s review/follow-up chamber 
issued 213 follow-up orders.  The chamber also organized public 
hearings in which the court invited representatives of public 
agencies, civil society and experts to present information on the 
implementation of the judgment’s orders.143  Although this 
monitoring process was designed to keep the Executive 
accountable, the process had several weaknesses.  While the court 
convened voluntary independent experts (of which this author was 
one), there remained a substantial lack of technical capacity that 
made interpreting health data and other information difficult.144  In 
addition, latent and at times open conflict –what one informant 
referred to as a “Cold War”—between the court and the Executive 
resulted in extensive, abstract and complicated reports delivered 
by the Executive that were difficult for the court to understand, 
and which made the monitoring process even more difficult.145 
When President Juan Manuel Santos took office in August 
2010, health system reform was one of the first issues on the 
agenda.  However, according to Everaldo Lamprea, former 
Auxiliary Magistrate of the court in charge of the follow-up unit 
                                                             
[https://perma.cc/SR5U-37HM] (holding that the declaratory decree of a state of 
emergency relating to public health is unconstitutional). 
 140 Lamprea 2014, supra note 55, at 148. 
 141 Lamprea 2015, supra note 6, at 117 (describing the response of the 
Colombian people and health professionals to the decrees and the Constitutional 
Court ruling). 
 142 Young and Lemaitre, supra note 127, at 195 (detailing the political 
aftereffects of the failed decrees on the Uribe government, such as the loss of the 
2010 election). 
 143 Id. at 192. 
 144 Id. at 192. 
 145 Jorge I. Palacio, El Punto Ciego en el Derecho a la Salud Efectiva, Entre el 
Simbolismo y la Evidencia Social (Presentation in Quibdo -Department of Choco- 
during a visit of the Constitutional Court) (Jan. 31, 2015), 
http://viva.org.co/attachments/article/271/Punto%20ciego%20salud%20-
%20Jorge%20Iv%C3%A1n%20Palacio.pdf [https://perma.cc/V58E-8KXW]. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
728 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 49:3 
during some of this time, even though the Santos administration 
recognized issues critical to the efficiency and equity of the health 
system, and passed legislation in Law 1438 that introduced 
important reforms, such as pharmaceutical policy, priority setting, 
and the significance of primary care, health promotion and 
prevention, between 2010-2014 it was the review chamber, 
composed of Jorge Ivan Palacio and two other justices, which most 
dramatically influenced the government’s decision making 
processes related to health.146 
During these years, the review/follow-up chamber convened 
two public hearings, in July 2011 and in May 2012.  Lamprea 
characterized these public hearings as spaces of authentic 
deliberation that created substantial pressure on the government 
for such issues as the pharmaceutical regulation.147 
More broadly, some commentators have described these 
hearings as potentially destabilizing mechanisms that prompted 
the government to commit to public policies designed to comply 
with the judgment’s orders.148  Others have noted that although the 
court created forums that made it possible to express extremely 
divergent opinions, there was no actual deliberation taking place—
merely the declaration of widely differing views in a relatively 
“safe space.”149  Indeed, some view Cepeda’s original opinion 
skeptically because it attempted to paste a deliberative process 
onto a profoundly unequal, polarized and non-deliberative 
society.150 
Many agree on limits in practice even if they do not concur on 
the responsibilities for those defects: the hearings have not been 
open enough to guarantee the participation of the most vulnerable; 
access to information has not been easy to obtain for the public or 
even for many civil society organizations; and the criteria for 
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participation in hearings, conferences, events and consultations has 
not been clearly set.151 
Yet, at the same time, commentators agree that the court did 
spur the government to adopt the new statutory framework Law 
on Health, which was passed by Congress in May 2014.  The law 
was reviewed and declared to be constitutional by the 
Constitutional Court in judgment C-313/14 with important 
revisions.  In the decision, the court provided for greater deference 
to physicians and limited the possibility of restriction on 
treatments by administrative mechanisms and bodies.  The court 
also made clear that the system was going to be based on a 
presumption of inclusions, and that the list of goods and services 
excluded should be determined based on a participatory process, 
as called for in the law.152  The court also insisted on aspects of 
quality of care and asserted the need for integral care and the 
continuity of care, maintaining that the obligation to provide 
health services cannot be interrupted for any administrative or 
economic reasons.153  Lamprea and García have argued that “Law 
1751 and the Colombian Constitutional Court’s ruling C-324 are 
good indicators that Colombian policymakers and judges are 
trying to close the gap between formal and material health care 
coverage.  We are particularly optimistic about the convergence 
between the right to health and health care coverage in Law 
1751.”154 
I disagree.  In its best light, Justice Cepeda’s original opinion 
can be read as an effort to catalyze a broader political discussion 
about the collective construction of “no.”155  This approach in 
contrast recreates the pitfalls of implicit rationing, based on 
waiting lists and doctor discretion (which is greatly enhanced 
under the statutory law), which will invariably favor the better off 
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in Colombian society.  By creating a list of exclusions, the statutory 
law reproduces an already existing problem of “gray zones.”  
Because everything is included unless it is explicitly excluded, the 
law may turn out to substantially expand uncertainty around 
covered services.156  Many agree that the executive branch’s efforts 
to promote civic participation in defining the exclusions were not 
adequate.  Although the Ministry did surveys and media efforts, it 
lacked a coherent methodology for deliberative participation.  At 
the end of the day, there is skepticism that the lack of process will 
again lead people to distrust the definition of benefits package.157 
The significance of the process to define the contours of the 
updated POS, and in turn, the right to health cannot be overstated.  
Although it may appear to be driven only by highly technical 
considerations, priority setting reflects profound ethical and 
normative judgments.158  If health is to be taken seriously as a right 
in Colombia, the criteria to include or exclude goods and services 
from the benefits packages must be made explicit, visible to the 
public and be subject to justification by the political branches of 
government.159  As Young and Lemaitre argue, it appears likely 
that “[i]f the Colombian public does not understand the criteria 
used to include and exclude certain treatments in the new POS, 
and if the criteria for these decisions are not clear, people may very 
well continue to seek redress in massive numbers through court 
orders [tutelas], as the only mechanism through which to defend 
their right to health.”160 
Beginning in 2014, the court implemented a more dogmatic 
approach to the monitoring process, demanding evidence of 
compliance in particular cases that, from its point of view, 
represent examples of weakness in the Ministry of Health’s 
initiatives.161  The very specific orders with which the court 
demanded compliance—such as conditions in a departmental 
hospital—also arguably went beyond the original orders in T 
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760/08.162  Over this period of time, a noticeable shift in tutela 
claims that went beyond the POS could be detected from access to 
medicines and treatment, to tutelas claiming ancillary services, 
including payments for caregivers.163  A lawyer involved in the 
original opinion and the implementation of the case noted that the 
follow-up had ceased to be “dialogical judicialism” when the court 
got involved in such details rather than focusing on the original 
opinion’s structural orders.164  At the same time, larger issues such 
as criteria for participation in priority-setting and evaluations of 
oversight and regulation seemed less front and center on the 
Court’s agenda.  The Ministry of Health reacted to this new more 
dogmatic approach and adversarial tone with some resistance, 
which was reflected in process of implementing the Statutory 
Framework Law which went into effect in 2017. 
Further, changes made to the statute of the Constitutional 
Court after a political scandal make it difficult for a review 
chamber to exercise ongoing review of a tutela in the same manner 
as T 760/08 and T 025/04 had done before.165  For example, a 2015 
case involving structural reform of prisons set up the civil society 
follow-up unit, but did not place a follow-up unit within the court 
itself.166  A 2017 judgment regarding health conditions in the very 
deprived department of Vaupés, where the issue was public health 
conditions and access to primary care,  called for significant 
structural changes, but notably established no follow-up unit.167  A 
2018 case from the court even appeared to show the willingness on 
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the part of some justices to limit the use of the tutela.168  Finally, in 
the wake of the new Statutory Framework Law, the turbulent post-
conflict situation Colombia faces, and the election of conservative 
President Ivan Duque in 2018, the current justices in the Follow-Up 
Chamber appear to be seeking criteria to close the T 760/08 
judgment. 
This experience of T 760/08 illustrates the importance of a 
shared understanding of the conditions for meaningful dialogue on 
grounds of rough equality, and of moving from an adversarial 
posture to a collaborative one in the implementation of such a 
systemic judgment.  It further demonstrates the need for setting 
explicit criteria, from the beginning, for both defining the 
parameters of such a monitoring process, and under what 
circumstances the court could consider follow up to be complete, 
without capitulating to the political vicissitudes of the day.169  The 
T 760/08 decision stretches the boundaries of judicial authority, 
but even so reveals the limited capacity of even the most assertive 
courts to transform the institutional arrangements necessary to 
realize health rights in practice. 
4.  CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
The experience of constitutionalization and judicialization of 
the right to health in the region shows a number of lessons and 
challenges.  The setting of priorities to include within obligatory 
social insurance schemes in the region is generally not done in a 
systematic and transparent fashion that provides room for social 
consultation and deliberation regarding the criteria for ranking 
services and treatments.  Rather, health systems are often plagued 
by irrational rationing and implicit forms of allocating care—
through waiting lines, access to specialists, out-of-pocket 
payments.  In this context of poor responsiveness from the 
executive and legislative branches of government, as well as 
chronic regulatory failures within health systems, it is unsurprising 
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that people take advantage of the favorable opportunity structures 
that exist in many courts. 
Structural reforms in constitutions have been as important as 
the enumeration of specific rights relating to health in constitutions 
across the region in producing the rise in judicialization.  
Individual exploitation of opportunities within systems has 
exploded, using constitutional litigation as an avenue, while 
broader collective efforts to reform the health systems through 
litigation are far less frequent.  Such individual litigation for 
entitlements, while often better understood as regulatory gap 
problems, can challenge principles of formal equality by fostering 
queue-jumping for expensive medications and treatments by those 
with better access to justice.  It also may distort health systems 
toward curative care, rather than investing in long-term structural 
infrastructure for the health system and in preconditions for health, 
which have wider benefits for the disadvantaged. 
In response to the massive judicialization in health, as well as 
to other systemic and structural problems, some courts in the 
region, including those in Argentina and Colombia, have issued 
broad structural remedies.  These judgments need not be seen as 
isolated from social struggles.170 
Indeed, Judgment T-760/08 led not just to a new Statutory Law 
on Health, but also to the reframing of the discourse around the 
health system and crisis in Colombia.171  After the T-760/08 
Judgment, civil society groups were quick to appropriate the 
definition of health as a fundamental right, which led to the 
origination of social organizations, academia, and NGOs focused 
on activities around the statutory law.172  However, the actual 
participation in redefinitions of the benefits scheme, or exclusions 
therein, or of new health policies, has been limited.173  Meaningful 
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dialogue in a sector as rife with asymmetries of power and 
technical information poses particular challenges to 
democratization through dialogue.  Similarly, the backdrop of a 
deeply polarized society and non-representative government, 
which may be particularly acute in Colombia but is similarly 
present in other countries, poses a stark challenge to the necessary 
limit-setting process that fair-minded deliberation should foster. 
Ultimately, health is a very sensitive reflection of social justice, 
and health systems are intimately connected to the degrees of 
social solidarity and democracy that exist in countries.  Thus, even 
the most progressive and innovative of courts can only offer feeble 
alternatives to more robust egalitarian aspirations.  Just as Garcia 
Villegas and Uprimny have argued generally that “constitutional 
justice can become an important tool for democratic progress, as 
long as it is part of broader social struggles,” so too may be said of 
health justice in particular. 174 
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